http://www.mosharrafzaidi.com/2010/02/23/principles-of-policy-part-i/
http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=225731

Principles of policy
Part I

Tuesday, February 23, 2010
by Mosharraf Zaidi

In his column last week, my friend Harris Khalique quotes a small part of Article 38 of the Constitution, which is titled, “Promotion of social and economic well-being of the people”. Harris’s reminder is simple, timely and important. In the age of a palpable Pakistani rule of law narrative, the Constitution is too easily and too often reduced to a political hot potato, used primarily in the national conversation as an instrument of political advantage.

The Constitution, of course, is bigger. It is bigger than the petty politics that has defined the PPP’s repeated attempts to pretend like it’s 1973 for sure. But it is also bigger than the heroic lawyers’ movement, the still-nascent Pakistani media and the inexplicably weak parliamentary opposition to the PPP. No matter what side one takes in these seemingly existential debates in Pakistan, the Constitution is bigger than the sum of these parts. It is not just about the chief justice, or the NRO, or judicial appointments. Despite the advantage that the PPP has repeatedly handed to its opponents unerringly since it took power in 2008, the Constitution is bigger than both those that seek to let it grow and breathe in the space that was originally sought for it, and those that seek to tie it in knots and manipulate it for whatever specific purpose they seek to derive from it.

The Constitution is the overarching framework around which Pakistan is supposed to be organised. Its articulation of the way Pakistan is supposed to be is surprisingly clear and accessible (if you happen to be comfortable with the English language). At its very heart, the Constitution is about defining Pakistan. That the definition of Pakistan is spoken of in the present rather than the past participle is not necessarily tragic. What is tragic is that in the grand Pakistani drama, the national conversation is so pre-occupied with the petty politics of the thaana and the kutchehri that it has almost no time at all to focus on issues about which there is little or no disagreement at all. Article 38 is a subset of a more important section that is almost entirely absent from the national conversation. That section of the Constitution is a compendium of values that are supposed to define Pakistan’s personality, and is called the “Principles of policy”.

The “Principles of policy” section has a total of twelve articles, Article 29 through Article 40. Of these twelve articles, two are devoted to the definition of the section, and ten articulate the actual principles. Pakistanis are often bludgeoned with stark reminders of how far short their country falls on international indices of performance. Whether it is the ambient level of human development, or the openness of Pakistan’s markets, or the perception of corruption, everywhere Pakistanis turn, they find their country being ranked among the world’s bottom-feeders.

One way to test the degree of discrimination or bias that may be actively being practised by the international community is to judge Pakistan by its own standards, rather than those of others. And there is no less controversial and more comprehensive set of standards of behaviour, or features of personality, for Pakistan than the Constitution’s “Principles of policy”.

Let’s see how Pakistan measures up against each of the ten principles of policy defined in the Constitution.

The first principle is Article 31 titled “Islamic way of life”. Pakistanis that want more religion in their country are unhappy to the point of having taken up arms against the state. Pakistanis that want less religion in their country are unhappy to the point of actively promoting and supporting the carpet-bombing of villages in their own country. Suffice it to say, the Pakistani state’s performance in enabling Pakistani Muslims to be the best they can be is so dismal, that the bruises from these failures cannot be hidden. Pakistan’s key existential dilemmas, more than sixty years after coming into being, continue to constitute issues related to the appropriate role of faith in determining public policy.

Article 32 is titled “The promotion of local government institutions”. The exact text reads, “The state shall encourage local government institutions composed of elected representatives of the areas concerned and in such institutions special representation will be given to peasants, workers and women”. Each version of Pakistan’s local government system has been motivated by a military dictator’s zealous lust for the centralisation of power — by draining the provinces of their rightful autonomous status as power-brokers in the Pakistani federation. Rather than fixing what is wrong with military-endorsed local government systems, politicians are all too happy to scrap them, because democratised local governments would eat away at the family-dominated, centralised political party system. The Pakistani state has utterly failed to promote local government institutions.

The third principle is titled “Parochial and other similar prejudices to be discouraged”. Article 33 states that “The state shall discourage parochial, racial, tribal, sectarian and provincial prejudices among the citizens”. This would be funny only if it was fictional. Having sustained and nurtured tribal codes of conduct and justice for the entire duration of its existence in FATA, and having cultivated and nourished the feudal systems of Balochistan, Sindh and Southern Punjab, the Pakistani state has not just tolerated parochial and tribal prejudices. It has actively endorsed and sustained them. The fact that even in the 21st century, little girls can be traded by tribes as penalties is a reflection of how deep the failure of the state has been in living up to the standards of behaviour defined by the principles of policy.

Article 34 is titled “Full participation of women in national life”, and it has the second shortest description of all the principles, saying simply that “Steps shall be taken to ensure full participation of women in all spheres of national life”. Article 35 is titled “Protection of the family, etc.” and is the shortest of all the principles, saying simply that “The state shall protect the marriage, the family, the mother and the child”. The ratio of women in Pakistan’s civil services is shameful. Less than 9 per cent of all federal civil servants (BPS 17 and above) are women. The ratios are likely to be lower in the provincial services, and opportunities for women to make career progressions that lead to leadership positions in government are few and far between. The judiciary, the military and the private sector are not dramatically different. The Pakistani state hardly has much of a defence. It is keen to hand out women’s representation where it can make little impact, such as quotas for unelected representation — but extremely stingy where it can — such as in the public services. The Pakistani state has done a number of small things over the years to integrate women into public life, but those efforts have been miniscule compared to the challenge. The fifth principle about protecting the family is kind of moot when the state’s performance on protecting and promoting women has been as poor as it has.

The sixth principle is Article 36: “Protection of minorities”, and it says that “The state shall safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of minorities, including their due representation in the federal and provincial services”. What possible thing can be said in support of whatever symbolic efforts may exist in this regard while the memory of Gojra hangs in the air like the pungent smell of death?

Of the six principles, thus far, not a single one represents an area of success. Pakistanis can legitimately be disappointed at how little the Pakistani state has done to live up to the words and ideals articulated by the framers of the 1973 Constitution. But insofar as principles go, the meat and potatoes of the “Principles of policy” lie in Articles 37, 38, 39 and in part Article 40.

tbc…